null Skip to main content

✨ Buy more, save 5% Ends

Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Funding Manager Decisions and Deposit Insurance Refor

Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Funding Manager Decisions and Deposit Insurance Refor

$15.75
$14.30
(No reviews yet) Write a Review
Physical book delivery

Shipping calculated at checkout.

Estimated delivery
Adding to cart… The item has been added
Product Details
Author:
Daniel M. Covitz
Publisher:
Bibliogov
Publication Date:
Feb 06, 2013
Number of pages:
46 pages
Binding:
Paperback or Softback
ISBN-10:
1288712014
ISBN-13:
9781288712014

Overview

We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline: " The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced.


  • | Author: Daniel M. Covitz
  • | Publisher: Bibliogov
  • | Publication Date: Feb 06, 2013
  • | Number of Pages: 46 pages
  • | Binding: Paperback or Softback
  • | ISBN-10: 1288712014
  • | ISBN-13: 9781288712014

Reviews

0 Reviews

Write a Review

No reviews yet.

Share your experience and help another reader choose their next book.

Discover your next great book

Get new releases, reader favourites, and special offers delivered to your inbox.