Overview
We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management share ownership encourages higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems--those with low market-to-book ratios and low management stock ownership. We also find that management stock options change the composition of payouts. We find a strong negative relationship between dividends and management stock options, as predicted by Lambert, Lannen, and Larcker (1989), and a positive relatinship between repurchases and management stock options. Our results suggest that the growth in stock options may help to explain the rise in repurchases at the expense of dividends.
- | Author: United States Federal Reserve Board
- | Publisher: Bibliogov
- | Publication Date: Feb 06, 2013
- | Number of Pages: 34 pages
- | Binding: Paperback or Softback
- | ISBN-10: 128871808X
- | ISBN-13: 9781288718085